Digested-Tile 2024-09-12
Authors:: Bry B., Jonny S., and WikiWe contributors License:: CC BY-SA 4.0 Digest Root:: 0211bb208c13
MarkdownTile
2. Collision Resistance
The security of digest tags relies on the collision resistance of the truncated SHA-256 hash.
Theorem 2: The probability of a collision in k-bit truncated SHA-256 hashes for m distinct inputs is approximately: P(collision) ≈ 1 - e^(-m^2 / (2 * 2^k))
Proof: This is derived from the birthday problem approximation. For our 12-character (48-bit) truncated hashes: P(collision) ≈ 1 - e^(-m^2 / (2 * 2^48))
For m = 10^6 documents: P(collision) ≈ 1 - e^(-10^12 / (2 * 2^48)) ≈ 0.0018
This demonstrates a low collision probability even for a large number of documents.
These calculations demonstrate the theoretical efficiency and security of the Doc Seal Protocol’s core components.
DeformattedTile
Collision Resistance The security of digest tags relies on the collision resistance of the truncated SHA-256 hash. Theorem 2: The probability of a collision in k-bit truncated SHA-256 hashes for m distinct inputs is approximately: P(collision) ≈ 1 - e^(-m^2 / (2 2^k)) Proof: This is derived from the birthday problem approximation. For our 12-character (48-bit) truncated hashes: P(collision) ≈ 1 - e^(-m^2 / (2 2^48)) For m = 10^6 documents: P(collision) ≈ 1 - e^(-10^12 / (2 2^48)) ≈ 0.0018 This demonstrates a low collision probability even for a large number of documents. These calculations demonstrate the theoretical efficiency and security of the Doc Seal Protocol’s core components.
EOT
Digested-Tile 2024-09-10
Authors:: Bry B., Jonny S., and WikiWe contributors License:: CC BY-SA 4.0 Digest Root:: 4f9564015b62
MarkdownTile
2. Collision Resistance
The security of digest tags relies on the collision resistance of the truncated SHA-256 hash.
Theorem 2: The probability of a collision in k-bit truncated SHA-256 hashes for m distinct inputs is approximately: P(collision) ≈ 1 - e^(-m^2 / (2 * 2^k))
Proof: This is derived from the birthday problem approximation. For our 12-character (48-bit) truncated hashes: P(collision) ≈ 1 - e^(-m^2 / (2 * 2^48))
For m = 10^6 documents: P(collision) ≈ 1 - e^(-10^12 / (2 * 2^48)) ≈ 0.0018
This demonstrates a low collision probability even for a large number of documents.
These calculations demonstrate the theoretical efficiency and security of the Doc Seal Protocol’s core components.
DeformattedTile
Collision Resistance The security of digest tags relies on the collision resistance of the truncated SHA-256 hash. Theorem 2: The probability of a collision in k-bit truncated SHA-256 hashes for m distinct inputs is approximately: P(collision) ≈ 1 - e^(-m^2 / (2 2^k)) Proof: This is derived from the birthday problem approximation. For our 12-character (48-bit) truncated hashes: P(collision) ≈ 1 - e^(-m^2 / (2 2^48)) For m = 10^6 documents: P(collision) ≈ 1 - e^(-10^12 / (2 2^48)) ≈ 0.0018 This demonstrates a low collision probability even for a large number of documents. These calculations demonstrate the theoretical efficiency and security of the Doc Seal Protocol’s core components.
EOT
Digested-Tile 2024-09-10
Authors:: Bry B., Jonny S., and WikiWe contributors License:: CC BY-SA 4.0 Digest Root:: 76d1457b183a
MarkdownTile
2. Collision Resistance
The security of digest tags relies on the collision resistance of the truncated SHA-256 hash.
Theorem 2: The probability of a collision in k-bit truncated SHA-256 hashes for m distinct inputs is approximately: P(collision) ≈ 1 - e^(-m^2 / (2 * 2^k))
Proof: This is derived from the birthday problem approximation. For our 12-character (48-bit) truncated hashes: P(collision) ≈ 1 - e^(-m^2 / (2 * 2^48))
For m = 10^6 documents: P(collision) ≈ 1 - e^(-10^12 / (2 * 2^48)) ≈ 0.0018
This demonstrates a low collision probability even for a large number of documents.
These calculations demonstrate the theoretical efficiency and security of the Doc Seal Protocol’s core components.
DeformattedTile
Collision Resistance The security of digest tags relies on the collision resistance of the truncated SHA-256 hash. Theorem 2: The probability of a collision in k-bit truncated SHA-256 hashes for m distinct inputs is approximately: P(collision) ≈ 1 - e^(-m^2 / (2 2^k)) Proof: This is derived from the birthday problem approximation. For our 12-character (48-bit) truncated hashes: P(collision) ≈ 1 - e^(-m^2 / (2 2^48)) For m = 10^6 documents: P(collision) ≈ 1 - e^(-10^12 / (2 2^48)) ≈ 0.0018 This demonstrates a low collision probability even for a large number of documents. These calculations demonstrate the theoretical efficiency and security of the Doc Seal Protocol’s core components.
EOT
Digested-Tile 2024-09-10
Authors:: Bry B., Jonny S., and WikiWe contributors License:: CC BY-SA 4.0 Digest Root:: 12d2260f056a
MarkdownTile
2. Collision Resistance
The security of digest tags relies on the collision resistance of the truncated SHA-256 hash.
Theorem 2: The probability of a collision in k-bit truncated SHA-256 hashes for m distinct inputs is approximately: P(collision) ≈ 1 - e^(-m^2 / (2 * 2^k))
Proof: This is derived from the birthday problem approximation. For our 12-character (48-bit) truncated hashes: P(collision) ≈ 1 - e^(-m^2 / (2 * 2^48))
For m = 10^6 documents: P(collision) ≈ 1 - e^(-10^12 / (2 * 2^48)) ≈ 0.0018
This demonstrates a low collision probability even for a large number of documents.
These calculations demonstrate the theoretical efficiency and security of the Doc Seal Protocol’s core components.
DeformattedTile
Collision Resistance The security of digest tags relies on the collision resistance of the truncated SHA-256 hash. Theorem 2: The probability of a collision in k-bit truncated SHA-256 hashes for m distinct inputs is approximately: P(collision) ≈ 1 - e^(-m^2 / (2 2^k)) Proof: This is derived from the birthday problem approximation. For our 12-character (48-bit) truncated hashes: P(collision) ≈ 1 - e^(-m^2 / (2 2^48)) For m = 10^6 documents: P(collision) ≈ 1 - e^(-10^12 / (2 2^48)) ≈ 0.0018 This demonstrates a low collision probability even for a large number of documents. These calculations demonstrate the theoretical efficiency and security of the Doc Seal Protocol’s core components.