Digested-Tile 2024-09-12
Authors:: Bry B., Jonny S., and WikiWe contributors License:: CC BY-SA 4.0 Digest Root:: d1ed7e8edad1
MarkdownTile
2. Collision Resistance
The security of digest tags relies on the collision resistance of the truncated SHA-256 hash.
Theorem 2: The probability of a collision in k-bit truncated SHA-256 hashes for m distinct inputs is approximately: P(collision) ≈ 1 - e^(-m^2 / (2 * 2^k))
Proof: This is derived from the birthday problem approximation. For our 12-character (48-bit) truncated hashes: P(collision) ≈ 1 - e^(-m^2 / (2 * 2^48))
For m = 10^6 documents: P(collision) ≈ 1 - e^(-10^12 / (2 * 2^48)) ≈ 0.0018
This demonstrates a low collision probability even for a large number of documents.
These calculations demonstrate the theoretical efficiency and security of the Doc Seal Protocol’s core components.
DeformattedTile
- Collision Resistance The security of digest tags relies on the collision resistance of the truncated SHA-256 hash. Theorem 2: The probability of a collision in k-bit truncated SHA-256 hashes for m distinct inputs is approximately: P(collision) ≈ 1 - e^(-m^2 / (2 * 2^k)) Proof: This is derived from the birthday problem approximation. For our 12-character (48-bit) truncated hashes: P(collision) ≈ 1 - e^(-m^2 / (2 * 2^48)) For m = 10^6 documents: P(collision) ≈ 1 - e^(-10^12 / (2 * 2^48)) ≈ 0.0018 This demonstrates a low collision probability even for a large number of documents. These calculations demonstrate the theoretical efficiency and security of the Doc Seal Protocol’s core components.
EOT
Digested-Tile 2024-09-12
Authors:: Bry B., Jonny S., and WikiWe contributors License:: CC BY-SA 4.0 Digest Root:: 91b2d4f735d8
MarkdownTile
2. Collision Resistance
The security of digest tags relies on the collision resistance of the truncated SHA-256 hash.
Theorem 2: The probability of a collision in k-bit truncated SHA-256 hashes for m distinct inputs is approximately: P(collision) ≈ 1 - e^(-m^2 / (2 * 2^k))
Proof: This is derived from the birthday problem approximation. For our 12-character (48-bit) truncated hashes: P(collision) ≈ 1 - e^(-m^2 / (2 * 2^48))
For m = 10^6 documents: P(collision) ≈ 1 - e^(-10^12 / (2 * 2^48)) ≈ 0.0018
This demonstrates a low collision probability even for a large number of documents.
These calculations demonstrate the theoretical efficiency and security of the Doc Seal Protocol’s core components.
DeformattedTile
- Collision Resistance The security of digest tags relies on the collision resistance of the truncated SHA-256 hash. Theorem 2: The probability of a collision in k-bit truncated SHA-256 hashes for m distinct inputs is approximately: P(collision) ≈ 1 - e^(-m^2 / (2 * 2^k)) Proof: This is derived from the birthday problem approximation. For our 12-character (48-bit) truncated hashes: P(collision) ≈ 1 - e^(-m^2 / (2 * 2^48)) For m = 10^6 documents: P(collision) ≈ 1 - e^(-10^12 / (2 * 2^48)) ≈ 0.0018 This demonstrates a low collision probability even for a large number of documents. These calculations demonstrate the theoretical efficiency and security of the Doc Seal Protocol’s core components.
EOT
Digested-Tile 2024-09-12
Authors:: Bry B., Jonny S., and WikiWe contributors License:: CC BY-SA 4.0 Digest Root:: 2db3874ac8e5
MarkdownTile
2. Collision Resistance
The security of digest tags relies on the collision resistance of the truncated SHA-256 hash.
Theorem 2: The probability of a collision in k-bit truncated SHA-256 hashes for m distinct inputs is approximately: P(collision) ≈ 1 - e^(-m^2 / (2 * 2^k))
Proof: This is derived from the birthday problem approximation. For our 12-character (48-bit) truncated hashes: P(collision) ≈ 1 - e^(-m^2 / (2 * 2^48))
For m = 10^6 documents: P(collision) ≈ 1 - e^(-10^12 / (2 * 2^48)) ≈ 0.0018
This demonstrates a low collision probability even for a large number of documents.
These calculations demonstrate the theoretical efficiency and security of the Doc Seal Protocol’s core components.
DeformattedTile
- Collision Resistance The security of digest tags relies on the collision resistance of the truncated SHA-256 hash. Theorem 2: The probability of a collision in k-bit truncated SHA-256 hashes for m distinct inputs is approximately: P(collision) ≈ 1 - e^(-m^2 / (2 * 2^k)) Proof: This is derived from the birthday problem approximation. For our 12-character (48-bit) truncated hashes: P(collision) ≈ 1 - e^(-m^2 / (2 * 2^48)) For m = 10^6 documents: P(collision) ≈ 1 - e^(-10^12 / (2 * 2^48)) ≈ 0.0018 This demonstrates a low collision probability even for a large number of documents. These calculations demonstrate the theoretical efficiency and security of the Doc Seal Protocol’s core components.